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Abstract
In this study, I explore the political budget cycle effect on foreign aid spending on
the extensive and intensive margins. I find evidence to support the statement that
foreign aid is not neutral to the existence of elections but is in fact manipulated by
the incumbent government one year before an election. This study is an
improvement from the recent literature in two distinct ways. First, I explore the
overall election cycle effect for the different sub-categories of official development
assistance (ODA): debt relief, infrastructure, humanitarian aid, multi-sector aid,
production aid, program aid, and social infrastructure aid. Second, I look at the
compositional changes of total ODA spending one year prior to an election. To avoid
endogeneity problems, I focused on donor countries with fixed election dates,
making elections exogenous. I included countries without fixed election dates for
comparison. I found that some types of assistance have a positive causal donor
election cycle effect while others have no significant donor election cycle effect. My
results also indicate donor governments shift aid spending to categories that are
visible to voters one year prior to an election. The results are robust to the extent that
the analysis includes numerous control variables to address the possibility of omitted
variable bias.
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1. Introduction
From 2012 to 2016, the current 30 members of the Development Assistance
Committee (DAC) have donated over 636 billion (US) dollars of official development
assistance (ODA)1. ODA is any aid flow which is provided by official agencies, including
state and local governments, or by their executive agencies, which is for the promotion of
economic development and welfare of developing countries as the main objective. ODA
can take on the form of debt relief, economic infrastructure aid, humanitarian aid, multisector aid, production aid, programme assistance, and social infrastructure aid. There are
many circumstances in which a donor government would help the global developing
community. For example, in times of emergency disasters, a government could decide to
increase humanitarian aid in the form of disaster relief. Another example of aid is the
restructuring of debt to strengthen economic ties or promote trade between two countries.
Although foreign aid only accounts for a small portion of a donor country’s budget, with
DAC members having a 0.7% ODA/GNI2 target, the study of the determinants of aid flows
is crucial in understanding the donor countries’ true intentions. For example, what if the
aid flows are not caused by pure altruism, but rather selfishly motivated to accomplish a
political agenda at home? In this study, I explore the political budget cycle effect on foreign
aid spending on the extensive and intensive margins. I find evidence to support the
statement that foreign aid is not neutral to the existence of elections but is in fact
manipulated by the incumbent government one year before an election.

1

This includes only official flows as reported by the OECD between 2012 and 2016 and it excludes aid
given to multilateral agencies such as the UN.
2
GNI: Gross National Income
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While politicians and scholars know foreign aid has some tangible benefits such as
achieving foreign policy goals and export promotion, a less studied issue is whether
politicians use foreign aid as a tool to increase their chances of re-election. A recent paper
by Annen and Strickland (2017) looked at the election cycle effect of one sub category of
ODA, humanitarian aid, and found a large positive causal election cycle effect. They
argued that because disasters that prompt humanitarian aid often receive a lot of media
attention, donor governments increase humanitarian aid spending abroad prior to an
election to boost support for re-election. In the current paper, I argue that there are three
reasons a positive causal effect between foreign aid and election cycles exists. First, voters
care about their government’s capacity to influence the world globally. Second, foreign aid
can be used as a tool to elevate support from different social communities. For example,
using multi-sector aid to promote gender and women’s rights globally may attract voters
who value these issues. Finally, foreign aid can be used to accomplish a policy agenda such
as trade promotion, which provides economic dividends to the donor country.
In this paper, I improve upon Annen and Strickland’s results by exploring the
political business cycle effect on the other 6 categories of ODA: economic infrastructure,
debt relief, multi-sector aid, production aid, programme assistance, and social
infrastructure aid. In addition, I look at the compositional changes of total ODA spending
caused by an up coming election. To the best of my knowledge, I am the first to look at
these compositional changes. By including all categories of ODA spending and the
compositional changes caused by an upcoming election, the results presented provide a
more holistic and insightful view on the relationship between elections and foreign aid
spending.
2

My results indicate that, on average and for countries with fixed elections, foreign
aid increases substantially. For instance, social infrastructure and economic infrastructure
registered the biggest increases of 167% and 117% respectively. On the other hand,
humanitarian aid increased by only 57% one year prior to an election. More interestingly
are the compositional changes in total ODA spending, which shows donor governments
shift spending to aid types that are visible to voters and government determined. I define
“visible aid” as aid that is easily observable by voters through any form of media and define
government determined as an aid type that is not heavily influenced by any type of random
event such as a disaster. My results indicate that, for countries with fixed elections, social
infrastructure is the most responsive to an upcoming election with its percentage of total
ODA spending increasing by 101% and production aid being the least responsive with its
percentage of total ODA spending increasing by 33%. When looking at these results for
the extensive and intensive margins, they fit well with my hypotheses that: (a) Aid
spending, on average, increases one year prior to an election; and (b) On average, visible
aid categories crowed out non-visible aid categories one year prior to an election.
In line with recent literature, I tested my hypotheses by examining the effects of
elections in 18 donor countries- 8 with fixed elections, 10 with non-fixed electionsbetween the years 1995 and 2012. Figure 1 shows total expenditure on each of the sub
categories of ODA. Also included in the figure for comparison is the number of elections
that occurred each year. The main results focus on the countries with fixed elections
making elections completely exogenous. I define a country as one that has fixed elections
if the election occurs at a fixed date and the date cannot be changed by a majority of

3

incumbent elected officials. Fixed elections happen because of institutional constraints
(e.g. constitution, laws, regulations, etc).
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Figure 1: Aid Expenditures by Category 1995-2012
Finally, I look at the importance of public opinion on foreign aid spending. For this,
I ran a regression using a public opinion value as a country fixed effect on a subgroup of
the 18 full sample countries (countries included in the 2013 Eurobarometer survey).
Treating this value as a country fixed effect allowed me to capture cross-country variation
in public opinion and the effect this has on the overall aid spending on each sub category
of ODA. The results indicate that government expenditure on development assistance is
higher in countries that report elevated levels of support for foreign aid. The importance of
this result will be outlined in Chapter 5.3.

4

The results I obtain are robust to the extent that I include control variables such as
real GDP growth, general budget deficit, and party affiliation, and remain statistically
significant. To avoid endogeneity problems with real GDP growth, the general budget
deficit, and the amount of foreign aid expenditure, I lagged all control variables by one
period. All regressions include donor and year fixed effects, so the election cycle effects
come from within-panel variation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 describes this study’s
contribution to the literature, section 3 presents the theoretical framework, section 4
describes the data, section 5 presents the donor panel results, and section 6 concludes this
paper.

2. Literature Review
Much research has been done regarding donor and recipient specific determinants
of aid flows. These studies examine the nexus of recipient characteristics and needs, the
donor’s strategic and political interests, and the size of the aid flows. They find that factors
such as colonial past, political alliance, trade partners, institutional quality, protection of
property rights, population, geographic location, and strategic interests are all major
determinants in the amount and type of aid given to a country (e.g. Alesina & Dollar, 2000;
Burnside & Dollar, 2000; Classens, Cassimon & Van Campenhout, 2009; Dippel, 2015;
Dollar & Levine, 2006; Neumayer, 2003). These influential papers on the determinants of
foreign aid flows tend to focus on the recipient determinants. The current paper
distinguishes itself from this literature in several respects. First, it shifts focus from
recipient determinants of aid flow to the donor countries’ determinants, specifically
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elections. Second, this paper looks at all 7 subcategories of ODA spending, outlined by the
OECD, individually. Lastly, the most important contribution to the literature this paper
provides is the finding that one year prior to an election, incumbent governments alter the
composition of ODA spending. My results indicate that, one year prior to an election, the
percentage share of total ODA spending increases for types of aid that are visible to voters.
To my knowledge, this is the first paper to explore the election cycle effect on the
composition of total ODA spending.
Traditionally, literature on the political budget cycle focuses on domestic
expenditure and compositional changes caused by an upcoming election (see Brender,
2003; Galli & Rossi (2001); Kneebone & McKenzie, 2001; Khemani, 2004; Drazen &
Eslava, 2010; Hanusch & Keefer, 2014). For example, Kneebone and McKenzie (2001)
find that Canadian provincial governments tend to increase spending on schools and roads
in the year prior to an election. A paper by Garmann (2017) tested whether the political
budget cycle depends on levels of fiscal conservatism among voters. He found that preelection spending is increased only if voters have sufficiently low levels of fiscal
conservatism. If voters are highly fiscally conservative, there is no increase in spending.
This paper differentiates itself from the main body of political businesses cycle literature
by focusing on the effects of an upcoming election on foreign aid expenditures, specifically
each of the ODA subcategories. An interesting paper by Faye and Niehaus (2012) looked
at political businesses cycles in recipient countries and aid flows to those countries. They
found that donors use bilateral aid to influence elections in developing countries; thus, aid
is not neutral to the existence of elections in recipient countries. This paper adds to this
argument by showing multiple categories of aid, as well as the composition of total ODA
6

expenditures, are not neutral to the existence of elections in the donor country. A recent
paper by Annen and Strickland (2017) shows that elections affect humanitarian aid
spending. By exploring the political budget cycle effect on the sub-categories of ODA, this
paper echoes their statement that the models of political agency and the election process
developed by Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986) should include money spent by the
incumbent government abroad as well.
The importance of aid to voters has been identified as key determinant of a donor
government’s allocation of aid funding. Voters preferences affect not only the quantity, but
the quality of aid distributions (Mosley, 1985). Paul Collier, the author of The Bottom
Billion (2007), asserts that a key obstacle to aid reform is public opinion in donor countries.
He argues that the policies of aid agencies in countries where there is little support for
foreign aid are overly risk adverse, causing the delivery of aid to be sub optimal. Paxton
and Knack (2011) argue that understanding the determinants of support for foreign aid can
help the aid practitioners make better arguments in favor of aid. Improved understanding
of foreign aid can help develop education efforts to reduce public opinion as an obstacle to
administering effective aid (Paxton & Knack, 2011). It has been found that during times
of economic crisis, such as the 2007-2008 financial crisis, there is generally a reduction in
aid. For instance, Heinrich, Kobayashi, and Bryan (2015) found that the view that
budgetary constraints caused by crises reduce aid is inaccurate because donor
governments’ expenditures tend to increase; rather, aid cuts occur because voters place a
lower priority on aid. A review essay by Milner and Tingley (2013) looked at foreign aid
perception in the United States. They found that public knowledge on the budget share of
foreign aid is enormously over estimated. This over estimation of foreign aid spending may
7

cause voters to change their perspectives on foreign aid during economic crisis and view
aid flows as a charity they cannot afford (Heinrich et al., 2015). The evidence presented in
this study simply reinforces the arguments of the above authors that foreign aid is subjected
to the gauntlet or public opinion, and that public opinion can have both positive and
negative implications for aid funding.

3. Theoretical Framework
The most important mechanism to hold elected politicians accountable for their
policy choices are elections. Based on the idea that incumbents want to secure re-election,
Nordhaus (1975) and Tufte (1978) pioneered the literature on “political business cycles.”
The idea is that incumbent politicians often employ expansionary fiscal policies before
elections to increase their re-election chances. Precisely, a political budget cycle is a
periodic fluctuation in a government’s spending policies, which is induced by the
cyclicality of elections (Brender & Drazen, 2005). Drazen (2008) offers two explanations
on the phenomenon of political business cycles. The first explanation is that voters’ favour
low taxes and high government expenditures, and therefore elect incumbents who provide
them. The second explanation is that voters respond to good economic conditions by being
more likely to vote for the incumbent. Regardless of the explanations, because voters do
not observe all government expenditure, there is an incentive for politicians to increase
spending in areas that voters can observe (Annen & Strickland, 2017).
For the case of spending on foreign aid, the motivations are slightly different and
somewhat complicated. First, voters in the donor country may view the capacity to provide
foreign aid as an indicator of the incumbent government’s ability to influence the world
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globally (Annen & Strickland, 2017). Second, incumbents can use foreign aid spending to
woo votes from certain types of voters. For instance, foreign aid spending intended for the
promotion of women’s rights may appeal to voters who care about women’s issues. Third,
foreign aid spending can be used to secure better trade deals which accrue economic
benefits to a donor country which, in turn, can boost the incumbent’s chances of re-election.
These ideas point to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: On average, all types of aid increase one year prior to an election.
The above hypothesis can be empirically tested by running a regression with log
foreign aid (‘aid’) as the dependent variable and an election dummy (‘election’) as the main
explanatory variable:
aid𝑗𝑗 𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 ∗ election𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ,

(1)

where i indexes the donor country, j indexes the type of aid, and donor and year
fixed effects are μ and γ, respectively. In equation (1), the dummy variables ‘election’
assumes a value of 1 if an election occurred in the previous year. The parameter αcaptures
the political business cycle effect. On the extensive margin, I expect that the value of α is
positive and statistically significant.
It is possible that the election dummy variable is endogenous to foreign aid. For
instance, donor governments may choose the date of their elections to correspond with
elevated levels of voter support generated by addressing social issues or the strength of the
country’s economy (Annen & Strickland, 2017). If not considered, the endogenous
relationship between foreign aid and elections may lead to biased estimates for 𝛼𝛼. Hence,

as in Annen and Strickland (2017), I address the endogeneity problem by running
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regressions with two samples: donors with institutionally fixed election dates and donors
without fixed election dates.
Donors may increase foreign aid allocated towards activities that are visible to
voters, relative to other types of aid (i.e., the less visible ones). On the intensive margin,
donors may increase foreign aid to some types of aid that are ‘visually appealing’ to certain
groups of voters. Take for example foreign aid towards social infrastructure, which is more
visible than debt relief. Foreign aid directed to social infrastructure through the provision
of health care, education, water and sanitation, as well as social protection, may appeal to
voters who passionately care about these issues. A rational incumbent, therefore, may
allocate more aid to social infrastructure and less toward debt relief with the goal to win
re-election.
Hypothesis 2: On average, visible aid categories (i.e. economic infrastructure, multisector aid, social infrastructure) crowed out non-visible aid categories (i.e. debt relief,
programme assistance) one year prior to an election.
To test the second hypothesis, I ran the following regression model similar to
equation (1):
aid𝑗𝑗 𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡

total aid𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡

= 𝛽𝛽 ∗ election𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ,

(2)

My hypothesis is supported if the sign of 𝛽𝛽 is positive and significant for aid that is

more visible. To address the endogeneity concern, I used the same approach in equation
(1) where I used a sub-sample of countries with constitutionally fixed election dates.
Elections with fixed dates are clearly exogenous.
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4. Data Sources
The data I used on the national elections in donor countries comes from the National
Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA) database. The NELDA dataset
includes information on more than 2,600 election events in 157 countries from 1945-2012
(Hyde and Marinov, 2012). In line with the current literature, I focus on elections where
the leader of the country’s government is elected. Annen and Strickland (2017) define these
elections as those which “consist of executive elections in presidential democracies and
parliamentary elections in parliamentary democracies” (p. 3). The countries included in
this sample and the election years are summarized in Table 1.
There are 85 election events in this sample, 41% of which are fixed-term elections.
The average donor in a non-fixed-term election date country experienced about 5.3
elections during the sample period, and the average donor in a fixed-term election date
country experienced about 4 elections. On average, the elections occur 28% of the time for
the ODA donor countries.
I obtain the data on Official Development Assistance (ODA) from the OECD’s
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) database. This study focuses on the following
categories of ODA: debt relief, infrastructure, humanitarian aid, multi-sector aid,
production aid, programme aid, and social infrastructure aid. The DAC defines these
categories of aid as follows:
•

Debt relief is any form of debt reorganization which relieves the overall burden of debt
(i.e. debt forgiveness, rescheduling, refinancing).

11

Table 1: ODA Countries and Election Frequencies
Country

Fixed Election

Election Years

Incidence Rate

Australia

No

1996, 1998, 2001, 2004, 2007, 2010

7.06%

Austria

Yes

1998, 2004, 2010

3.53%

Belgium

No

1995, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2010

5.88%

Canada

No

1997, 2000, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2011

7.06%

Denmark

No

1998, 2001, 2005, 2007, 2011

5.88%

Finland

Yes

2000, 2006, 2012

3.53%

France

Yes

1995, 2002, 2007, 2012

4.71%

Germany

Yes

1998, 2002, 2005, 2009

4.71%

Italy

No

1996, 2001, 2006, 2008

4.71%

Japan

No

1996, 2000, 2003, 2005, 2009, 2012

7.06%

Netherlands

No

1998, 2002, 2003, 2006, 2010, 2012

7.06%

New Zealand

No

1996, 1999, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2011

7.06%

Norway

Yes

1997, 2001, 2005, 2009

4.71%

Spain

No

1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2011

5.88%

Sweden

Yes

1998, 2002, 2006, 2010

4.71%

Switzerland

Yes

1995, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011

5.88%

United Kingdom

No

1997, 2001, 2005, 2010

4.71%

USA

Yes

1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012

5.88%

Source: National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA) database.

•

Infrastructure aid covers assistance for networks, utilities and services that facilitate
economic activity.

•

Humanitarian aid is used for the purposes of disaster prevention and preparedness,
reconstruction relief, relief coordination, protection and support services, emergency
food aid, and other emergency/distress relief.
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•

Multi-sector aid is intended for projects which straddle several sectors, with a
concentration on the environment, gender projects and urban and rural development.

•

Production aid is applied to all directly productive sectors.

•

Programme aid is support for the implementation of macroeconomic reforms
(structural adjustment programmes, poverty reduction strategies); general programme
assistance (when not allocable by sector).

•

Social infrastructure aid covers efforts to develop the human resource potential and
ameliorate living conditions in aid recipient countries.
The descriptive statistics for the seven categories of ODA are summarized in Table

2. The data in Table 2 is expressed in million $US. On average, and for the period of study,
the largest percentage of total ODA spending is on social infrastructure aid, while program
aid is the smallest percentage.
Additional donor variables such as real GDP growth rate and general budget deficit were
sourced from the OECD statistics database. Real GDP growth rate is defined as the
percentage change in real GDP, while the general budget deficit is defined by the OECD
as “gross savings plus net capital transfers (receivable minus payable) minus gross capital
formation, followed by the subtraction of acquisitions minus disposals of non-produced,
non-financial assets.” This indicator is measured as a percentage of GDP. A positive budget
deficit value means the government is in a net lending position providing financial resource
to other sectors while a negative budget deficit value means the government is in a net
borrowing position requiring financial resources from other sectors. Data for political
parties was sourced from ParlGov. The political party’s variable, called party affiliation,
13

Table 2: ODA descriptive statistics (In million USD)
Variable

Observations Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Debt Relief

287

492.84

900.45

-2.44

5,775.11

Economic Infrastructure

321

613.91

1145.00

3.35

6,111.24

Humanitarian

320

329.27

778.56

-71.42 5,879.12

Multi-Sector

320

338.74

461.87

5.26

3,914.99

Production

321

303.60

428.81

8.54

2,253.47

Programme Assistance

314

205.78

403.16

0.03

3,676.55

Social Infrastructure

321

1,567.56 2,631.33

54.85

17,737.23

Source: OECD.
assumes a value of 1 if the government is right-leaning, 2 if center, and 3 if left-leaning.
Thus, a higher (lower) value of the party’s variable indicate a left- (right-) leaning
parliament. Lastly, I obtained the information on foreign aid importance from the 2013
Eurobarometer survey.

5. Results
5.1 Foreign aid and Elections
Table 3 Panel A presents the regression results for equation (1) using the full sample
of countries. In all the regressions, I obtain a positive coefficient for the election dummy
variable. This means that, on average, elections increase foreign aid spending in all aid
categories one year prior to an election. This is consistent with the hypothesis of foreign
aid being affected by political election cycles. All the estimated coefficients for the
elections dummy are significant at the 1% level. Of the different types of aid, social
infrastructure aid is the most responsive to election cycles while program assistance is the
least responsive. The results indicate that foreign aid for social infrastructure increased by

14

Table 3: Elections and Foreign Aid, Results 1.
Panel A, Full Country Sample
Dependent Variables (In log constant USD)
Debt Relief
Election
Dummy

1.273***
(0.331)

Economic
Infrastructure
1.370***
(0.283)

N

286

321

15

0.663
0.786
Adj R-Sq
Panel B, Countries with Fixed Elections.
0.643
0.775*
Election
(0.607)
(0.410)
Dummy

Humanitarian
Aid
1.026***
(0.241)

MultiSector
1.332***
(0.264)

Production
1.272***
(0.254)

Program
Assistance
0.872***
(0.247)

Social
Infrastructure
1.709***
(0.325)

312

320

321

314

321

0.841

0.790

0.798

0.775

0.798

0.454*
(0.249)

0.699*
(0.398)

0.631*
(0.348)

0.232
(0.352)

0.985*
(0.505)

N

130

143

143

143

143

139

143

Adj R-Sq

0.600

0.834

0.933

0.848

0.855

0.820

0.831

Note: All Regressions include Donor and Year fixed effects. Standard errors in parenthesis. Significant levels: *:10%; **:5%; ***1%.

a factor of 5 one year before an election. In contrast, program assistance merely doubles
one year before an election.
It is possible that the results in Panel A are biased because of the endogenous
relationship between foreign aid and elections. Hence, I ran a separate regression shown in
Table 3 Panel B for equation (1) but only for countries with fixed elections. Notable is the
reduction in the size of the estimated coefficient for the election dummy compared to the
estimates in Panel A. The reduction in the size of the coefficients suggests that the election
dummy variable is upward biased. For instance, the estimated coefficients for social
infrastructure in the full country sample is 1.709 and for the fixed election only sample is
0.781. According to the log-level formula %𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥 = (𝑒𝑒 𝛼𝛼 − 1) ∗ 100, the political business

cycle effect on social infrastructure is 452% and 167% respectively. My results for
humanitarian aid are similar to the results found by Annen and Strickland (2017) in their

study on the political budget cycle effect on humanitarian aid. Both coefficients are positive
and significant, but my results indicate a 58% increase in humanitarian aid spending one
year prior to an election while their results indicate a 18% increase. Although my results
indicate a much higher increase, both results support a positive causal relationship between
elections and humanitarian aid. Although debt relief and program assistance lost their
statistical significance in the fixed election sample, the coefficients for economic
infrastructure, multi-sector aid, and production aid are positive and statistically significant
at the 10% level. When looking at the R-squared values in Panel B of Table 3 for estimated
coefficients that are statistically significant categories, the model explains over 80 percent
of the variation. This result provides evidence on the strength of my hypothesis.
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Table 4: Elections and Foreign Aid, Results 2.
Panel A: Full Country Sample
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Debt Relief

Economic
Infrastructure

Dependent Variables (In log constant USD)
Humanitarian
Multi-Sector
Production
Aid

Election
dummy

0.889***
(0.322)

1.076***
(0.266)

0.897***
(0.246)

1.130***
(0.256)

1.005***
(0.248)

0.672***
(0.244)

1.333***
(0.317)

Real GDP
growth rate

0.492***
(0.075)

0.332***
(0.070)

0.320***
(0.066)

0.370***
(0.072)

0.359***
(0.069)

0.224***
(0.061)

0.558***
(0.093)

General
budget deficit

-0.271***
(0.041)

-0.169***
(0.033)

-0.094***
(0.024)

-0.150***
(0.032)

-0.163***
(0.031)

-0.103***
(0.025)

-0.193***
(0.039)

N

263

293

285

292

293

287

293

Adj R-Sq

0.735

0.822

0.860

0.824

0.834

0.797

0.838

Program
Assistance

Social
Infrastructure

Panel B: Countries with Fixed Elections Only.
Election
dummy

0.440
(0.531)

0.655*
(0.393)

0.386
(0.242)

0.627*
(0.364)

0.497
(0.322)

0.141
(0.358)

0.781*
(0.466)

Real GDP
growth rate

0.467***
(0.132)

0.164*
(0.087)

0.127*
(0.066)

0.215**
(0.088)

0.181**
(0.083)

0.009
(0.071)

0.359***
(0.122)

General
budget deficit

-0.264***
(0.051)

-0.134***
(0.032)

-0.049***
(0.016)

-0.049***
(0.016)

-0.112***
(0.030)

-0.086***
(0.024)

-0.150***
(0.039)

N

123

135

135

135

135

132

135

Adj R-Sq

0.697

0.856

0.938

0.869

0.876

0.834

0.857

Note: All Regressions include Donor and Year fixed effects. Standard errors in parenthesis. Significant levels: *:10%; **:5%; ***1%.

Table 4 presents the regression results for equation 1 with additional control
variables, real GDP growth rate, and general budget deficit. Including real GDP growth is
important because income of the donor country is one of the most important determinants
of aid. I included general budget deficit as an additional control as this represents the fiscal
decisions incumbent governments make. As shown in Panel A, Table 4, including real GDP
growth and general budget deficit in the regressions did not change the signs of the
estimated coefficients for the full donor sample, and all of the estimated coefficients are
significant at the 1% level. However, some of the aid types lost their statistical significance
for the fixed election sample. The estimated coefficients that remained statistically
significant in the fixed election only sample are for economics infrastructure, multi-sector,
and social infrastructure. These coefficients are significant at the 10% level. When looking
at real GDP growth, as expected, in the full sample is positive and significant at the 1%
percent level; this means that as a country’s real income increases, their foreign aid
expenditures increase. For the fixed sample, real GDP growth is still a powerful
determinant of foreign aid expenditures with only programme assistance losing all
significance. Intuitively, the sign of the general budget deficit is consistent with the notion
that as a country’s budget deficit increase, foreign aid expenditures decrease. When
comparing the R squared values from Tables 3 and 4, all R-squared values are higher in
the latter. The driving force behind this increase is the inclusion of the control variables
real GDP growth and general budget deficit. In Table 3 and Table 4, when looking at the
most responsive aid type social infrastructure, Table 3’s R-squared value is 0.831 and Table
4’s value is 0.857. These results imply that 83.1% of the variation in social infrastructure
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spending is explained by the election cycle while inclusion of the controls in Table 4
increases the explanatory power of the model by merely 2.6% to 85.7%.
It is well known that left-leaning governments have different spending preferences
than right learning governments. Beland and Oloomi (2017) investigated whether party
affiliation of governors in the United States (Democrat or Republican) has an impact on
the allocation of state expenditures. They found that Democratic governors allocate a larger
share of their budget to health and education but there was no impact on total spending.
Hence, to capture incumbent governments preferences, I included the political party’s
affiliation variable in the regressions, and the estimation results are presented in Table 5.
Including political party’s affiliation failed to overturn the results in Table 3. The estimated
coefficients of the party affiliation variable are positive and significant at the 1% level in
both the Panel A, the full country sample, and Panel B, the fixed elections only sample. As
mentioned previously, this variable can take on 3 values: 1 if the government is right
leaning, 2 if centric, and 3 if left leaning. This implies that political parties that are left
leaning spend more on all categories of foreign aid than political parties that are centric
and right leaning.
When including party affiliation along with real GDP growth and budget deficits,
the resulting election coefficients are all still positive but smaller than those found in Table
3. When including the party affiliation value, social infrastructure remains the most
responsive, 111% compared to the results in Table 3, 167%. This decrease, along with an
increase in R-squared values, suggests the results in Table 3 are biased due to omitted
variables. In Table 3, social infrastructure’s R-squared value is 0.831, meaning the model
used explains 83.1% of the variation in social infrastructure spending. In Table 5, the R19

Table 5: Elections and Foreign Aid, Results 3.
Panel A: Full Country Sample
Debt Relief

Dependent Variables (In log constant USD)
Humanitarian
Multi-Sector
Production
Aid
0.885***
1.120***
0.989***
(0.246)
(0.256)
(0.248)

Program
Assistance
0.659***
(0.237)

Social
Infrastructure
1.305***
(0.314)
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Election
dummy

0.883***
(0.315)

Economic
Infrastructure
1.055***
(0.264)

Real GDP
growth rate

0.467***
(0.074)

0.313***
(0.069)

0.309***
(0.065)

0.360***
(0.072)

0.345***
(0.068)

0.203***
(0.059)

0.532***
(0.091)

General
budget deficit

-0.263***
(0.040)

-0.163***
(0.031)

-0.090***
(0.023)

-0.147***
(0.031)

-0.158***
(0.030)

-0.096***
(0.023)

-0.184***
(0.036)

Party
affiliation

0.002***
(0.000)

0.002***
(0.000)

0.001***
(0.000)

0.001***
(0.000)

0.001***
(0.000)

0.002***
(0.000)

0.003***
(0.000)

N
Adj R-Sq

263
0.741

293
0.828

285
0.862

292
0.825

293
0.837

287
0.809

293
0.845

Panel B: Countries with Fixed Elections.
Election
dummy

0.422
(0.517)

0.627*
(0.364)

0.368*
(0.221)

0.609*
(0.357)

0.476
(0.307)

0.134
(0.311)

0.746*
(0.433)

Real GDP
growth rate

0.414***
(0.134)

0.119
(0.080)

0.098
(0.060)

0.185**
(0.083)

0.147*
(0.077)

-0.039
(0.068)

0.303***
(0.111)

General
budget deficit

-0.266***
(0.050)

-0.137***
(0.029)

-0.051***
(0.013)

-0.114***
(0.028)

-0.124***
(0.026)

-0.090***
(0.021)

-0.154***
(0.035)

Party
affiliation

0.002***
(0.001)

0.003***
(0.000)

0.002***
(0.000)

0.002***
(0.000)

0.002***
(0.000)

0.003***
(0.000)

0.003***
(0.000)

123
135
135
135
135
132
N
0.708
0.878
0.948
0.877
0.890
0.870
Adj R-Sq
Note: All Regressions include Donor and Year fixed effects. Standard errors in parenthesis. Significant levels: *:10%; **:5%; ***1%.

135
0.878

squared for social infrastructure is 0.878, meaning this model explains 87.8% of the
variation in social infrastructure spending. This increase in explained variation is a direct
result of the inclusion on Real GDP growth, the general budget deficit, and party affiliation.
These three controls only account for 4.7% of the variation in social infrastructure
spending. When comparing the R-squared values from Table 4 and Table 5 for social
infrastructure, 0.857 and 0.878 respectively, it really highlights the importance of including
the political party’s preference in the model. These values indicate that party affiliation
explains 2.1% of variation in social infrastructure spending, almost the same amount as
real GDP growth and the general budget deficit combined. All R-squared values are
greatest in Table 5 because inclusion of the three controls increases the explanatory power
of the model.
5.2 Elections and Visible Aid
Table 6 reports the estimated coefficients for equation (2), which estimate the
compositional changes to ODA spending caused by an upcoming election:
aid𝑗𝑗 𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡

total aid𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡

= 𝛽𝛽 ∗ election𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ,

(2)

When looking at the full country sample presented in Panel A, one can observe that
all the coefficients are positive with program assistance losing all significance and debt
relief only appearing significant at the 10% level. More interesting are the results from the
sample of countries with fixed elections presented in Panel B. All coefficients remain
positive, but a significance drop across all forms of aid occurs with debt relief and
humanitarian aid losing all significance compared to the full country sample. Also notable

21

Table 6 Elections and Visible Aid
Panel A: Full Country Sample
Debt Relief

Dependent Variables (log, share of aid to total ODA)
Economic
Humanitarian Multi-Sector Production
Program
Infrastructure Aid
Assistance

Social
Infrastructure

Election
dummy

0.468*
(0.244)

0.782***
(0.133)

0.463***
(0.156)

0.704***
(0.127)

0.645***
(0.121)

0.223
(0.148)

1.076***
(0.198)

N

280

281

275

281

281

281

281

Adj R-Sq

0.280

0.756

0.685

0.735

0.735

0.420

0.760

Panel B: Countries with Fixed Elections.
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Election
dummy

0.379
(0.384)

0.466**
(0.201)

0.169
(0.205)

0.471**
(0.187)

0.282*
(0.163)

0.053
(0.168)

0.700**
(0.318)

N

126

126

126

126

126

126

126

Adj R-Sq

0.158

0.799

0.785

0.816

0.813

0.473

0.792

Note: All Regressions include Donor and Year fixed effects. Standard errors in parenthesis. Significant levels: *:10%; **:5%; ***1%.

is the reduction in size of the coefficients from Panel A to Panel B. As with Table 3, this
coefficient reduction suggests upward endogeneity bias. As stated before, endogeneity bias
may exist in the full country sample because a donor country, which does not have an
institutionally fixed election, may choose the date of their elections to correspond with
elevated levels of voter support generated by addressing social issues or the strength of the
country’s economy (Annen & Strickland, 2017).
These results are in line with my hypothesis that incumbent governments
manipulate the composition of total ODA spending and shift aid spending to areas that are
visible to voters and can provide economic dividends to the donor country and do not
depend on emergency situations. In other words, one year prior to an election, aid that is
visible to voters has a higher percentage share of ODA spending.
When looking at the percentage of total ODA spending changes, Social
Infrastructure is the most responsive in both the full sample and fixed election sample,
193% and 101% respectively. In the fixed sample, production assistance is the least
responsive to an upcoming election, 33%. These numbers indicate that the percentage of
total ODA spending allocated to social infrastructure doubles one year prior to an election
while production assistance percentage share of total ODA increases by only 30 percent.
5.3 Aid Importance
I included a regression using Aid Importance as the explanatory variable to show
the effect of voter’s preference on foreign aid spending decisions. In this regression, due to
the low overlap between the 18-country sample used in previous regressions and the
countries where this survey was distributed, I could not separate fixed election countries
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from the full sample. Instead, I grouped all overlapping countries together into a single
sample. There is a possibility of an endogenous relationship between policy and public
preferences which may cause bias in the estimated coefficients. In this analysis, I am not
concerned with the magnitude of the estimated coefficients but rather the sign of the
estimated coefficients as this represents the relationship between voters’ preferences and
foreign aid spending. I derived this variable from the 2013 Eurobarometer survey. This
survey included the following statement and question:
B. EU DEVELOPMENT AID AND MILLENIUM DEVELOPMENT
GOALS
The EU provides development aid to assist certain countries outside the
EU in their fight against poverty and in their development. EU
development aid consists of the aid provided by both the European
Commission and the national Governments of the EU Member States.
QB1
In your opinion, is it very important, fairly important, not very important
or not at all important to help people in developing countries?
Respondents were required to answer a Likert scale that had 5 points: very
important, important, not very important, not at all important, and DK. The results were
presented as a percentage of total respondents for each of the four importance levels. To
generate my aid importance variable, I grouped the very important and fairly important
respondents together and used this percentage value as the fixed effect for each country
that took part in the survey and is part of the 18-country sample.
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Table 7 Aid Importance and Foreign Aid
Full Country Sample
Debt Relief
Importance

-8.381***
(2.054)

Economic
Infrastructure
4.169***
(1.589)

Dependent Variables (log, Constant USD)
Humanitarian
Multi-Sector Production
Aid
7.923***
2.329
0.799
(0.830)
(1.418)
(1.096)

Program
Assistance
0.028
(1.663)

Social
Infrastructure
1.815
(1.178)

286
321
312
320
321
314
321
N
0.677
0.796
0.843
0.793
0.804
0.790
0.809
Adj R-Sq
Note: All Regressions include Donor and Year fixed effects. Standard errors in parenthesis. Significant levels: *:10%; **:5%; ***1%.
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The results are summarized in Table 7. The results indicate that countries where
voters place higher importance on foreign aid spend more on foreign aid. I found that only
economic infrastructure and humanitarian aid are positive and significant at the 1% level,
while debt relief is negative and significant at the 1% level. All other forms of aid were not
found to be significant. The results are presented to demonstrate that foreign aid levels are
directly related to public preferences on aid flows. The explanation to this could have
something to do with the public’s perception and understanding of foreign aid. Public
perception about foreign aid and what foreign aid is tends to fall into economic
infrastructure and humanitarian aid categories (e.g. building bridges and emergency food
aid) while other forms of aid such as programme assistance are unbeknownst to the general
populace. An incumbent government looking at results from the Eurobarometer survey
knows about this skewed perception towards visible aid and knows that if they want to
increase support for re-election, they must act in a way to show voters they pursue policies
consistent to their preferences.
The results from this regression are in line with the work from Heinrich, Kobayashi,
and Bryant (2015) who looked at public opinions and foreign aid cuts in economic crises.
They argue that during times of economic crisis, public opinion about helping the global
poor changes and that the levels of aid are overestimated and seen as a form of charity.
Extending their results that voters’ perception of aid impacts government aid decisions and
combining the results I found support a causal relationship between voter’s aid attitudes
and government foreign aid spending decisions. As such, an incumbent government may
take advantage of voters overestimating the values of foreign aid and increase aid spending
in visible areas to increase support for re-election.
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6. Conclusion
This paper provides insights into the political determinants of debt relief, economic
infrastructure aid, humanitarian aid, multi-sector aid, production aid, programme
assistance, and social infrastructure aid from the donor countries’ perspective. The
empirical analysis in this paper supports the theory that foreign aid is not neutral to the
existence of elections. Rather, several categories of ODA see substantial increases on the
extensive margin one year prior to an election. On the intensive margin, the composition
of aid is also not neutral to the existence of elections. One year prior to an election, the
percentage of visible aid, with respect to total ODA spending, increases substantially
relative to non-visible aid. This result provides evidence of a crowding out effect of visible
aid prior to an election. For the analysis on the extensive and intensive margins, I focus on
countries with fixed elections making elections clearly exogenous. Lastly, this analysis
includes regressions on voter’s preferences towards development aid.

It shows that

countries spend more on foreign aid when their populace places higher importance on aid
spending.
Further research on the election cycle effect on ODA spending should include more
data. For example, the country sample could be expanded to include all 30 DAC members,
as well as expanding the time periods to include more elections. Another avenue for further
research is to look at technological advancement in how voters receive information and the
election cycle effect on foreign aid (e.g. pre vs post broadband internet adoption, pre vs
post wide spread social media adoption) to see if these social changes affect the election
cycle effect on foreign aid. Finally, the inclusion of a dyadic panel analysis of bilateral aid
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and development of a formal theoretical model to explain the results found in this paper
would help enrich the results.
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